There is no period in the history of philosophy so difficult to understand as that period beginning upon Kant's death and extending up into the present. Attributing this difficulty to the proximity and contingence of the period to our own is not a satisfactory excuse, though we would be willing to admit we lack some of the clarity that “time passed” gives. If we give up the challenge of making a meaningful interpretation of this history because we lack perspective, we (...) are surrendering a period whose lessons might prove immeasurably valuable to us. What is more important than such negative motivation for making a meaningful study of the philosophy of the last 100 years is the positive demand that we begin to develop techniques for understanding the present and immediate past, in order that we can more effectively face and contribute to the present and future. (shrink)

The papers given at this symposium have been directed to two problems: the needs of the physical sciences which the social sciences should fulfill, andthe capacity of contemporary social science to satisfy these needs.Consideration of the first problem divided itself into two parts: the needs involved in the process of answering questions in the physical sciences, and the needs involving application of information gained by questions in physical science. The role of social science with respect to is generally recognized, but (...) the role with respect to is not. Many, in science and philosophy, still hold to the notion of a non-evaluative, non-normative, purely objective, or what-have-you physical science. Professor Littauer, however, raised a critical problem in this regard: on what basis is the decision made to accept or reject a scientific hypothesis? We are in a position today to assert that such decisions do involve an evaluative judgment. Recent developments in mathematical statistics, as represented in Wald's On the Principles of Statistical Inference, indicate that the selection of the best statistical testing procedure involves at least a knowledge of the social consequences for the various mistakes one might make in using any specific testing procedure. The introduction of the “weight function” into the method for selecting among alternative hypotheses points in a striking way to one door through which knowledge and evaluation of possible social phenomena enters physical science. The social scientist is badly needed here. It is true that today this aspect of experimental method is seldom self-consciously faced. Where it is, the evaluations are generally intuitive and are not based on sound sociological knowledge. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the continued development of experimental methods in all sciences depends on our reducing the question of what constitutes a “best” test to experimental terms. (shrink)

The boundaries of psychology have never been very distinctly defined and, as a consequence, science has witnessed frequent border incidents. But it obviously is not psychology alone which suffers from such lack of delineation, but its neighbors, the biological and social sciences, do as well. Cooperation between sciences becomes difficult under these conditions. All agree that psychology is the science of mind, but few agree to what “mind” is. At least within our century “mind” has been taken to be “behavior”, (...) for the present day outlook is that mind is behavior rather than that which is responsible for behavior. The metaphysical dynamism of a prime mover has been replaced by an experimental concept, i.e., one that is susceptible to scientific investigation. There is no need to review the complex history of behavioristic psychology in its many ramifications, ranging from Watson's mechanism to the various vitalistic teleologies. We turn instead to a fundamental problem on which there is little agreement: “What kind of behavior should be called mind?”. (shrink)

“Unification of Science” is probably the most popular slogan in contemporary philosophy. This phrase has not only become the cry of a specific group of philosophers, but it is now accepted as one of the aims of philosophy by most of the contemporary philosophic schools, with but few exceptions. Each particular school believes that it has found the way of effecting such a unification, implicitly assuming that it knows the conditions for a unified science. One who concerns himself with the (...) literature of the movements soon becomes aware of current confusion in the meaning of the expression, “Unification of Science“. The observer begins to wonder whether “Unity of Science” has not become a philosophic stereotype, designed to evoke feeling rather than thought. (shrink)

'The purpose of this book is to trace the opposition and interaction of two main causes of change in the Nineteenth century: the belief in freedom which was common to Liberals and Radicals, and the necessity for organization which arose through industrial and scientific technique.' - Bertrand Russell A revealing account by one of the twentieth century's greatest minds, charting the struggle between two determining forces in nineteenth century history: freedom and control. Russell's text sweeps from the defeat (...) of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna to the lead up to the First World War. It is full of lively portraits, including Malthus, Mill, Bentham and Marx. Russell examines the founding of democracy in America and the struggle with slavery, and brings to life the ideas of Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln. (shrink)

The philosophy of science has traditionally assumed that knowledge should be organized in the form of theories. From theories propositions can be deduced that can be tested in experiments. Most propositions deduced from theories take the form of if-then statements. For example, if variable A increases, what happens to variable B, assuming that all other variables are held constant? However, an alternative way of organizing knowledge, in the form of producer-product relationships, was proposed by the philosopher E.A. Singer, Jr. and (...) advocated by two of his students, C. West Churchman and Russell L. Ackoff. Whether to structure knowledge in the form of theories or methods is related to the question of whether there is a fundamental difference between the natural and the social sciences. As opposed to Karl Popper’s doctrine of the unity of method, this paper argues that structuring knowledge in the form of methods is appropriate in applied fields, particularly in management where a large part of the task is to achieve agreement among a group of knowing subjects on an appropriate set of actions. (shrink)

Previous papers have introduced the idea of a Dialectical Inquiring System (DIS), i.e., an Information System which for any issue presents strong pro and con arguments. The previous papers showed how the DIS could be made scientifically operational in terms of Russell Ackoff's Behavioral Theory of Communication. In this paper we show how the DIS can be represented in terms of Egon Brunswik's Lens Model. The Brunswik Lens Model formulation is most appropriate for the design of Behavioral Science (...) experiments. It also illuminates further properties of the DIS. We discuss both the use and current limitations of the model in terms of an example currently under experimental investigation. The paper, in effect, argues vigorously for a new methodology of science that is founded on anexplicit, systematic, andcontrolled use of conflict. (shrink)

The idea behind this book is that developing a conception of the physical world and a conception of mind is impossible without the exercise of agency, meaning "the power to alter at will one's perceptual inputs". The thesis is derived from a philosophical account of the role of agency in knowledge - the first time this has been attempted in the context of developmental psychology. The book is divided into three parts. In Part One, Russell argues that purely "representational" (...) theories of mind and of mental development have been overvalued, thereby clearing the ground for the book's central thesis. In Part Two, he proposes that, because objective experience depends upon the experience of agency, the development of the "object concept" in human infants is grounded in the development of executive-attentional capacities. In Part Three, an analysis of the links between agency and self-awareness generates an original theory of the nature of certain stage-like transitions in mental functioning and of the relationship between executive and mentalising deficits in autism. The book will be of particular interest to students and researchers in cognitive-developmental psychology, to philosophers of mind, and to anybody with an interest in cognitive science. (shrink)

Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? *Fanaticism* says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas's argument from *strange dependence on space and time*, and (...) Wilkinson's *Indology* argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a *separability* principle in the first case, and a *reflection* principle in the second) are *inconsistent* with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell *against* Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) *support* Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. (shrink)

Papers resulting from a conference at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, Berkeley, Calif., Aug. 1993.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Information, knowledge and understanding, history/tradition and novelty, fashion and science, show business and intellectual product are the contexts to review in order to answer the question why humanities have been losing credibility and have come under the hammer. The present article, informed by philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Mary Midgley, authors like Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards, semioticians like Algirdas Greimas and Roland Barthes and classical English literature, argue that the problem originates between the continuity of thought (...) and indoctrination, between the stance of Rectors of universities and henchmen in the politics of market economy, and it is best exemplified by the caricature of humanities in some universities resulting from the implementation of the courses of technical skills. Knowing that humanities have been prized for intellectual attainment (Lincoln Barnett, Paul Goodman), their precarious state seems to depend on unbalanced philosophical, ethical, educational and economic principles. With economy being the factor which is hard to dispute, political and ethical principles tend to invite a revision because of a traceable tendency to promote the production of the manageable rather than the enlightened. (shrink)

Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect A is at least as probable as another prospect B to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But in these contexts the usual (...) formulation of stochastic dominance is wrong. We show this with several counterexamples. Still, the motivating idea behind stochastic dominance is a good one: it is supposed to provide a way of applying dominance reasoning in the stochastic context of probability distributions. We give two new formulations of stochastic dominance that are more faithful to this guiding idea, and prove that they are equivalent. (shrink)

In his controversial book _An Outline of Philosophy_, first published in 1927, Bertrand Russell argues that humanity demands consideration solely as the instrument by which we acquire knowledge of the universe. From our inner-world to the outer-world, from our physical world to the universe, his argument separates modern scientific knowledge and our ‘seeming’ consciousness. These innovative perspectives on philosophy made a significant contribution to the discourse on the meaning, relevance and function of philosophy which continues to this day.